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Abstract 
 
Phishing is a form of electronic identity theft in which a combination of social engineering and web site spoofing 
techniques are used to trick a user into revealing confidential information with economic value. The problem of 
social engineering attack is that there is no single solution to eliminate it completely, since it deals largely with the 
human factor. This is why implementing empirical experiments is very crucial in order to study and to analyze all 
malicious and deceiving phishing website attack techniques and strategies. In this paper, three different kinds of 
phishing experiment case studies have been conducted to shed some light into social engineering attacks, such as 
phone phishing and phishing website attacks for designing effective countermeasures and analyzing the efficiency 
of performing security awareness about phishing threats. 
Results and reactions to our experiments show the importance of conducting phishing training awareness for all 
users and doubling our efforts in developing phishing prevention techniques. Results also suggest that traditional 
standard security phishing factor indicators are not always effective for detecting phishing websites, and alternative 
intelligent phishing detection approaches are needed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Online services simplify our lives. They allow us to access information ubiquitously and are 
also useful for service providers because they reduce the operational costs involved in offering a 
service. For example, online banking over the web has become indispensable for customers as 
well as for banks. Unfortunately, interacting with an online service such as a banking web 
application often requires a certain degree of technical sophistication that not all Internet users 
possess. For the last decade, such naive users have been increasingly targeted by phishing 
attacks that are launched by miscreants who are aiming to make an easy profit by means of 
illegal financial transactions. Phishing is a form of electronic identity theft in which a 
combination of social engineering and website spoofing techniques are employed to trick a user 
into revealing confidential information of economic value. Phishing techniques are continuously 
being updated and there are always new variations appearing. Phishing attackers use various 
tactics to lure or hijack a browser into visiting bogus sites. Ordinary Internet users cannot 
become familiar with all these phishing techniques easily. Unfortunately, phishing attacks are 
growing, both in numbers and in complexity. Phishing websites are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated. They can capture e-banking website details automatically without any action on 
the part of the victim. 
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Phishing website attacks are growing at a torrid pace. The numbers of phishing attacks and 
reported phishing sites are increasing every year, even every month. Damage caused by phishing 
is severe. The APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group) is an industry association focused on 
eliminating identity theft and fraud that result from the growing problem of phishing and email 
spoofing. This voluntary-based organization provides a forum to discuss phishing issues, trials 
and evaluations of potential technology solutions, and access to a centralized repository of 
reports on phishing attacks (Zin and Yunos, 2005). The number of unique phishing websites 
detected by this organization showed that there has been a huge increase in unique phishing sites 
all over the world. In December 2005, the forged phishing site alone exceeded 7,000 (Brooks, 
2006). APWG has also recently released a new report containing statistics of phishing attacks 
during the first half of 2009.  According to the APWG global phishing survey report (APWG, 
2009) there were at least 55,698 phishing attacks, around 7 per cent higher than the previous 
year. Those attacks occurred on 30,131 unique domain names. APWG identified that 4,382 were 
registered by phishers, representing about 14.5% of the domain names involved in phishing. In 
addition, phishing was detected on 3,563 unique IP addresses. The Gartner study (Gartner, 
2007) shows that phishing attacks escalated in 2007; more than $3 Billion was lost to these 
attacks. The survey found that 3.6 million adults lost money in phishing attacks in the 12 months 
ending in August 2007, as compared with the 2.3 million who did so the year before. And, in 
2008, Gartner reported a 39.8 per cent increase over the number of victims a year earlier. Media 
outlets have reported that phishing website-related scams have resulted in more than $5 billion 
in fraudulent bank and financial charges to date (Microsoft Corporation, 2008).  
 
 
1.1 Internet Banking (E-banking) 
Internet banking (e-banking) is defined as the automated delivery of new and traditional banking 
products and services directly to customers through interactive electronic communication 
channels. E-Banking includes the systems that enable customers, individuals or businesses, to 
access accounts, transact business, or obtain information on products and services through a 
public or private network, including the Internet (FFIEC, 2003). Commercial banking is 
undergoing rapid changes, as the international economy expands and advances towards 
institutional and market completeness. 
 
1.2 Phishing Websites  
Phishing is a relatively new internet crime in comparison with other forms, e.g., virus and 
hacking. More and more phishing web pages have been found in recent years in an accelerative 
way (Fu, et al., 2006). Its impact is the breach of information security through the compromise 
of confidential data and the victims may finally suffer losses of money or other kinds. A 
phishing website as shown in Figure1.2 is a broadly launched social engineering attack that 
attempts to defraud people of their personal information including credit card number, bank 
account information, social security number, and their personal credentials in order to use these 
details fraudulently against them (James, 2006). Phishing has a huge negative impact on 
organizations’ revenues, customer relationships, marketing efforts, and overall corporate image. 
Phishing attacks can cost companies tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars per attack in fraud-
related losses and personnel time. Even worse, costs associated with the damage to brand image 
and consumer confidence can run into the millions of dollars (Brooks, 2006). 
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1.3 Phishing and the Trust of E-banking Business  
 
Phishing websites can severely hurt Internet business, because people lose their trust in Internet 
transactions for fear that they will become victims of fraud. For example, many people believe 
that using on-line banking increases the likelihood that they will become victims of phishing 
websites and identity theft, even though on-line banking provides more secure identity 
protection than paper- and mail-based systems. 
  
The most harmful effect is that it will create “trust crises”. The trust will be eroded gradually 
without effective countermeasures to deal with the fraud, and everyone participating in network 
transactions will be harmed in the end. Trust is one of the most important determinants of 
successful e-banking (Suh and Han, 2002). Many researchers have argued that trust is essential 
for understanding interpersonal behavior and is relevant to e-banking. Trust is not merely a 
short-term issue, but also the most significant long-term barrier to realizing the potential of BtoC 
e-commerce (Gefen, 2002). Falling victim to phishing websites could steal a customer’s 
proprietary information such as their account information and passwords, trade secrets, or other 
intellectual assets. Theft of a customer’s confidential information could have a disastrous effect 
on the companies or banks using electronic technology and could damage the trust between 
them and their clients. 
 
Even in developed countries, many people are worried that their credit card details will be 
misused or hacked into, and are concerned about on-line fraud, such as phishing websites that 
offer imaginary services or items.  
  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Phishing websites are a recent problem. Nevertheless, due to their huge impact on the financial 
and on-line retailing sectors and since preventing such attacks is an important step towards 
defending against website phishing attacks, there are several promising approaches to this 
problem and a comprehensive collection of related works. In this section, we briefly survey 
existing anti-phishing solutions and a list of the related works. Dhamija and Tygar’s (2005) 
approach involves the use of a so-called dynamic security skin on the user’s browser. This 
technique uses a shared secret image that allows a remote server to prove its identity to a user in 
a way that supports easy verification by humans but which is difficult for the phishers to spoof. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires effort by the user. That is, the user needs to 
be aware of the phishing threat and check for signs that the site he/she is visiting is being 
spoofed. The proposal approach requires changes to the entire web infrastructure (both servers 
and clients), so it can succeed only if the entire industry supports it. Also this technique does not 
provide security for situations where the user login is from a public terminal. More recently, 
Dhamija et al. (2006) analyzed 200 phishing attacks from the Anti-Phishing Work Group 
database and identified several factors, ranging from pure lack of computer system knowledge, 
to visual deception tricks used by adversaries, due to which users fall for phishing attacks. They 
further conducted a usability study with 22 participants. The participants were asked to study 20 
different websites to see if they could tell whether they were fraudulent or authentic. The result 
of this study showed that age, sex and computer habits didn’t make much difference. They even 
noticed that pop-up warnings of invalid signature of the sites and visual signs of SSL (Secure 
Sockets Layer), padlocks etc. were very inefficient and were overlooked. They found that 23% 
of the participants failed to look at security indicators warning about phishing attacks and, as a 
result, 40% of the time they were susceptible to a phishing attack. Based on their analysis, the 
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authors suggest that it is important to re-think the design of security systems, particularly by 
taking usability issues into consideration. Wu et al. (2006) proposed methods that require web 
page creators to follow certain rules to create web pages, by adding sensitive information 
location attributes to HTML code. However, it is difficult to persuade all web page creators to 
follow the rules. 
 
Liu et al. (2005) analyzed and compared legitimate and phishing web pages to define metrics 
that can be used to detect a phishing page on visual similarity (i.e. block level similarity, layout 
similarity and overall style similarity). A web page is classified as a phishing page if its visual 
similarity value is above a pre-defined threshold. The phishing filter in IE8 is a toolbar approach 
with more features such as blocking the user’s activity on a detected phishing site. The most 
popular and widely-deployed techniques, however, are based on the use of blacklists of phishing 
domains that the browser refuses to visit. For example, Microsoft has recently integrated a 
blacklist-based anti-phishing solution into its Internet Explorer (IE8). The browser queries lists 
of blacklisted and whitelisted domains from Microsoft servers and makes sure that the user is 
not accessing any phishing sites. Microsoft’s solution is also known to use some heuristics to 
detect phishing symptoms in web pages (Sharif, 2005). Obviously, to date, the company has not 
released any detailed public information on how its anti-phishing techniques function. 
 
“The Phishing Guide” by Ollmann (2004) gives a detailed understanding of the different 
techniques often included in phishing attacks. The phenomenon that started as simple emails 
persuading the receiver to reply with the information the attacker required has evolved into more 
advanced ways to deceive the victim. Links in email and false advertisements sends the victim 
to more and more advanced fraudulent websites designed to persuade the victim to type in the 
information the attacker wants, for example to log into the fraudulent site mimicking the 
company’s original. Ollmann also presents different ways to check whether websites are 
fraudulent or not. Apart from inspecting whether the visited site really is secure through SSL 
(Secure Sockets Layer), the user should also check that the certificate added to the website 
really is from the company it claims to be from and that it is signed by a trusted third party. 
Focusing more attention on the URL can also often reveal fraudulent sites. There are a number 
of ways for the attackers to manipulate the URL to look like the original, and if the users are 
aware of this they can more easily check the authentication of the visited site. Watson et al. 
(2005) describe in their White Paper, “Know your enemy: Phishing”, different real-world 
phishing attacks collected in German and United Kingdom honeynets. Honeynets are open 
computer networks designed to collect information about different attacks out in the real world, 
for further forensic analysis. They noticed that phishing attacks using vulnerable web servers as 
hosts for predesigned phishing sites are by far the most common, compared to using self-
compiled servers. A compromised server is often host for several different phishing sites. These 
sites are often only active for a few hours or days after being downloaded to the server. 
PassMark (2005) includes a personalized image in a web page to indicate that the user has set up 
an account with the site. This approach places the burden on users to notice the visual 
differences between a good site and a phishing site and then to correctly infer that a phishing 
attack is underway. However, this requires user awareness and prior knowledge. Another 
approach is two-factor authentication, which ensures that the user not only knows a secret but 
also presents a security token (FDIC, 2004). However, this approach is a server-side solution. 
Phishing can still happen on sites that do not support two-factor authentication. Sensitive 
information that is not related to a specific site, e.g., credit card information and SSN, cannot be 
protected by this approach either. The PRIME project (Pettersson, et al., 2005) helps users to 
manage their on-line identity in a more natural and intuitive way using three UI paradigms. It 
supports drag-and-drop actions for personal information submission. It does not specifically 
target the phishing problem but its improved user interface could help users correctly manage 
their on-line information. One potential problem with the PRIME interface is its “Just-In-Time-
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Click-Through Agreements” (JITCTAs) that is used to generate “small agreements that are 
easier for the user to read and process”. Users could still ignore the agreements by directly 
clicking through the “I Agree” button. 
 
APWG provides a solution directory (APWG, 2005) which contains most of the major anti-
phishing companies in the world. However, an automatic anti-phishing method is seldom 
reported. Cyveillance Fraud Management (Kirda and Kruegel, 2005a) uses proprietary Internet 
monitoring technology to identify phishing-related activity such as suspicious domain 
registrations, phishing lures, spoofed sites and the post-attack sale of compromised credentials. 
Others include Internet Identity’s Domain Security Audit (Liu, et al., 2005). These approaches 
are mainly motivated to protect corporations’ interests. Nonetheless, they do not directly defend 
against phishing attacks for users. 
 
Gabber et al. (1999), present a tool that tries to protect a client’s identity and password 
information. They define client personality in terms of username, password and email address 
and introduce a function which provides clients with different personalities for the different 
servers they visit. Jakobsson introduced a new model, called a phishing graph, to visualize the 
flow of information in a phishing attack (Jakobsson, 2005). While this model is not, in essence, 
a defensive technique, it is the first step towards developing an abstract model for visualizing 
phishing. A phishing graph enhances the ability to analyze and understand the course of a 
phishing attack. TrustedBrowser (Ye and Smith, 2005) uses a synchronized random coloured 
boundary to secure the path from users to their browser. The trusted status content is marked in 
the trusted window whereas the server content is shown in the distrusted window. Anti-Phish 
(Kirda and Kruegel, 2005b) compares the domains for the same sensitive information in web 
pages to the domains in the caches. That is, if it detects that confidential information such as a 
password is being entered into a form on an distrusted website, a warning is generated and the 
pending operation is canceled. PhishHook (Stepp, 2005) converts a web page to “normal form” 
through text, images and hyperlinks transformations.  
 
PwdHash (Ross, et al., 2005), in contrast, creates domain-specific passwords that are rendered 
useless if they are submitted to another domain (e.g., a password for www.gmail.com will be 
different if submitted to www.attacker.com). 
The limitation of browser-based schemes is that they require prior knowledge of the target site, 
which is unfortunately not always available. More importantly, since phishing attackers are able 
to update the inducement techniques to get around those schemes, the effectiveness of these 
schemes is not convincing. In a proactive manner, a set of techniques are designed to capture 
phishing sites on the Internet.  
 
One of the popular methods of detection is using add-in toolbars for the browser. Chou et al. 
introduced one such tool, SpoofGuard (Chou, et al., 2004), that determines if a web page is 
legitimate based on a series of domain and URL-based tests. It uses domain names, URLs, links, 
and images to measure the similarity between a given page and the pages in the caches or 
histories. It looks for phishing symptoms (e.g., obfuscated URLS) in web pages and raises 
alerts. The technique examines the downloaded website using various stateful and stateless 
evaluations like checking for invalid links, URL obfuscation attempts etc. The major 
disadvantage with these approaches is that they are susceptible to attacks launched from the 
compromised legitimate website. Also, in many web-hosting domains the attacker could create a 
user account with the name login and launch a successful phishing attack by hosting the 
masqueraded page in his domain space, which would typically appear as 
www.domain.com/login, thereby circumventing the aforementioned approaches. Herzberg and 
Gbara (2004) proposed TrustBar, a third-party certification solution to phishing. The authors 
propose creating a Trusted Credentials Area (TCA). The TCA controls a significant area, 
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located at the top of every browser window, and large enough to contain highly visible logos 
and other graphical icons for credentials identifying a legitimate page. While their solution does 
not rely on complex security factors, it does not prevent spoofing attacks. Specifically, since the 
logos of websites do not change, they can be used by an attacker to create a look-alike TCA in a 
distrusted web page. 
 
It should be emphasized that none of the above defense techniques – blacklist, spoofing 
detection, password-scrambling, anti-phishing toolbars or spam filters – will completely make 
phishing attacks impossible to perpetrate. Instead, they provide valuable but scattered 
roadblocks impeding the attacker. 
 
 
 
3. PHISHING ATTACK STRATEGIES 
 
3.1 Phishing Attack Using Internet Access  
 
Most employees browse the web for personal reasons, such as on-line shopping or research, at 
some time. Personal browsing may bring employees, and therefore the company computer 
systems, into contact with generic social engineers who will then use the staff in an effort to 
gain access to the company resources. The two most common methods of enticing a user to click 
a button inside a dialog box are by warning of a problem, such as displaying a realistic operating 
system or application error message, or by offering additional services. 
The following Figure 1 shows how a hyperlink appears to link to a secure PayPal website 
(https), while the status bar does not show anything that indicates for sure that it will take the 
user to a hacker’s site. A hacker can suppress or reformat the status bar information. 
 
 
Figure 1: Web page phishing hyperlink 
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3.2 Phishing Attack using Phone Access 
 
The telephone offers a unique attack vector for social engineering hackers. It is a familiar 
medium, but it is also impersonal, because the target cannot see the hacker. Phone phishing 
hacking is not considered to be a major threat. However, as more businesses embrace this 
technology, phone phishing is set to become as widespread as e-mail and website phishing is 
now. 
The most common approach is for the hacker to pretend to be the IT supervisor or outsource IT 
support engineer, requesting in a hurry all passwords and authenticated credentials to analyze 
and resolve the claimed problems reported to him, as shown in the following Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Telephone phishing attacks 
 
Requests for information or access over the telephone are a relatively risk-free form of attack. If 
the target becomes suspicious or refuses to comply with a request, the hacker can simply hang 
up. But it should be noted that such attacks are more sophisticated than a hacker simply calling a 
company and asking for a user ID and password. The hacker usually presents a scenario, asking 
for or offering help, before the request for personal or business information is made (Business 
Security Guidance, 2006). 
 
4. PHISHING EXPERIMENTAL CASE STUDIES  
 
Conducting different kinds of phishing experiments can shed some light on social engineering 
attacks, such as phone phishing and phishing website attacks, and can also help us in designing 
effective countermeasures and analyzing the efficiency of performing training and security 
awareness about phishing threats (Jakobsson, et al., 2007). The surprising percentages of victims 
who disclosed their credentials in our phishing experiments underscore the need to redouble our 
efforts in developing phishing prevention techniques. 
 
 
4.1 Case Study 1: Phone Phishing Experiment 
 
For our testing specimen, a group of 50 employees were contacted by female colleagues 
assigned to lure them into giving away their personal e-banking accounts, user names and 
passwords (through social and friendly conversations with a deceitful purpose in mind). The 
results were surprisingly beyond expectations; many of the employees fell for the trick. After 
conducting friendly conversations with them for some time, our team managed to seduce them 
into giving away their internet banking credentials for fake reasons. Some of these lame reasons 
included checking their privileges and accessibility, or checking the account’s integrity and 
connectivity with the web server for maintenance purposes, account security and privacy 
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assurance…etc. To assure the authenticity of our request and to give it a social dimensional 
trend, our team had to contact them repeatedly, perhaps three or four times. 
 
Our team managed to deceive 16 out of the 50 employees into giving away their full e-banking 
credentials (user name and password), which represented 32% of the sample. This percentage is 
considered a high one especially when we know that the victims were staff members of a bank, 
who are supposed to be highly educated with regard to the risks associated with electronic 
banking services. A total of 8 employees (16%) agreed to give their user name only and 
refrained from giving away their passwords under any circumstances regardless of the excuse. 
The remaining 52% (26 employees) were very cautious and declined to reveal any information 
regarding their credentials over the phone, as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 Table 1: Phone phishing experiment 
 
Response to Phone Phishing 
 Experiment 
Number of  
Employees 
Giving away their full e-banking  
credentials(user name & password) 16 
Giving away only their e-banking  
user name without password 8 
Refused to reveal their credentials or  
any kind of information 26 
Total 50 
 
An overview of the results as shown in Figure 3 reveals the high risk of the social engineering 
security factor. Social engineering constitutes a direct internal threat to e-banking web services 
since it hacks directly and internally into the accounts of e-bank customers. 
 
 
Phone phishing experiment chart
Refused to reveal 
credentials ; 26; 
52%
Giving  their full 
 credentials; 16; 
32%
Giving  user name 
; 8; 16%
Giving away their full e-banking credentials(user name & Password)
Giving away only their e-banking user name without password
Refused to reveal their credentials or any kind of information
 
 
Figure 3: Phone phishing response chart 
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The results also show the dire need to increase the awareness of customers not to fall victims of 
this kind of threat which can have devastating results. 
 
4.2 Case Study 2: Website Phishing Experiment  
 
We engineered a website for phishing practice and study. The website was an exact replica of 
the original Jordan Ahli Bank website www.ahlionline.com.jo , designed to trap users and 
induce them by targeted phishing emails to submit their credentials (username and password). 
The specimen was inclusive of our colleagues at Jordan Ahli Bank after attaining the necessary 
authorizations from our management. 
We targeted 120 employees with our deceptive phishing email, informing them that their e-
banking accounts were at risk of being hacked and requesting them to log into their account 
through a fake link attached to our email using their usual customer ID and password to verify 
their balance and then log out normally. 
 
 
Deceiving Phishing Email 
 
E-banking Services BES 
 
We have automatically reviewed your accounts recently and we suspect that they were tampered with by an 
unauthorized third party. Protecting the security of your account and our network is our primary concern. 
Therefore, as a preventative measure, we have deactivated the services in your account that are liable for breaching 
and we kindly ask you to thoroughly follow the hereunder procedures to ascertain that your account is intact. 
 Login to your Internet Banking account. 
 Enter your Customer ID and Password as usual. 
 Review your recent account history for any unauthorized withdrawals or deposits. Report to us 
immediately if you suspect any unauthorized activity has taken place on your account. 
 After checking, we will automatically update your account records and reconnect it with the main web 
server database. Confirmation message will appear to you after successful update and reactivation of your 
account. 
“Thank you, 
 Your record has been updated successfully” 
 To get started,  please click on the link below: 
 
https://www.ahli.com/ahlionline 
 
We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause, and appreciate your assistance in helping us maintain the 
integrity of the entire ebanking system. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Banking Electronic Services Team 
 
 
The web site successfully attracted 52 out of the 120 targeted employees, representing 44% who 
interacted positively by following the deceptive instructions and submitting their actual 
credentials (customer ID, Password).  
Surprisingly, IT department employees and IT auditors constituted 8 out of the 120 victims 
representing 7%, which shocked me, since we expected them to be more alert than others. From 
other departments, 44 of the 120 targeted employee victims, representing 37%, fell into the trap 
and submitted their credentials without any hesitation. 
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The remaining 68 out of 120, representing 56%, were divided as follows: 28 employees (23%) 
supplied incorrect info, which seems to indicate a wary curiosity; and 40 employees, 
representing 33%, received the email, but did not respond at all, as shown in Table 2. 
  
 
Table 2: Phishing website experiment 
 
Response to Phishing 
 Experiment 
Number of  
Employees 
Interacted positively (IT Department) 8 
Interacted positively (Other Departments) 44 
Interacted negatively (Incorrect info) 28 
Interacted negatively (No response)  40 
Total 120 
 
The results clearly indicate as shown in Figure 4 that the target phishing factor is extremely 
dangerous since almost half of the employees who responded were victimized, particularly 
trained employees such as those of the IT Department and IT Auditors. 
Increasing the awareness of all users of e-banking regarding this risk factor is highly 
recommended; this includes customers and employees alike. 
 
Website phishing experiment chart
Interacted 
positively (Other 
departments); 44; 
37%
Interacted 
positively (IT 
department); 8; 
7%
Interacted 
negatively 
(Incorrect info); 
28; 23%
Interacted 
negatively (No 
response) ; 40; 
33%
Interacted positively (IT department) Interacted positively (Other departments)
Interacted negatively (Incorrect info) Interacted negatively (No response) 
 
 
Figure 4: Website phishing response chart 
 
4.3 Case Study 3: Phishing Website Survey Scenario Experiment  
 
After the success of our previous phishing website empirical experiment which was conducted 
at our bank, targeting a specific number of its employees (120), the bank was really interested in 
studying the vulnerability of their employees towards spear phishing e-banking websites, since 
targeted spear phishing attacks have always been more successful than generic phishing attacks 
in conning people and causing financial damage to companies and individuals. We found this a 
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good opportunity to perform a new usability study experiment to assess and to evaluate the 
accuracy and the precision of our 27 phishing website factors and features, previously collected 
and analyzed as a result of our cognitive walkthrough of phishing websites’ patterns and clues. 
 
This time, we decided to create two groups from our bank employees, each group consisting of 
50 participants. In the first group, the employees were totally naïve about the phishing threat and 
did not have any previous experience or training in dealing with this kind of social engineering 
phishing attack. Regarding the second group, we decided to choose the 50 employees from our 
previous 120 employee specimen who had participated in our previous phishing website 
experiment case, in order to measure and evaluate the effectiveness and the efficiency of prior 
phishing website awareness training, and past experience of dealing with phishing attack 
hacking incidents. In total, our new specimen was 100 bank employees; half of them were 
untrained (First group) and the second half were trained (Second group). 
 
We analyzed a set of phishing attacks and tricks to measure their effectiveness and influence, 
and developed 50 phishing and legitimate website survey scenarios which were collected from 
the APWG’s archive (APWG, 2008), and Phishtank archive (Phishtank, 2008). The scenarios 
analyzed were carried out with the latest scenarios added to the archive by APWG and 
Phishtank experts. The scenarios were described and explained in detail in their archives.  From 
these different scenarios, 30 out of the 50 were phishing websites and the rest were legitimate. 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  An example of phishing website scenario survey 
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We showed the two participating groups (trained and untrained) the 50 different website 
scenarios that appear to belong to decent financial institutions and reputable banks, as shown in 
Figure 5, and asked them to determine which ones were fraudulent and which ones were 
legitimate and to give the reason for their decision and evaluation. 
 
 We showed the participants that the purpose of this experiment was to help them discover their 
knowledge and awareness of the new rising phenomenon of social engineering phishing website 
attack, and their capability to identify and to distinguish the legitimate genuine website from the 
phishing spoofed website.  
 
For our part, the purposes of our experiment are to find the most common phishing clues and 
indicators that appear in the scenarios, to determine what aspects of a website effectively convey 
authenticity to our employees, and to try to identify which malicious strategies and attack 
techniques are successful at deceiving general users, and why (Alnajim and Munro, 2008).  
From this experiment, we also tried to determine the effectiveness and the value of 
implementing some security training awareness and phishing courses or classes about phishing 
threats and detection expertise, and how this might reflect the determination of website 
legitimacy by the second, trained, group. 
 
Our 27 phishing website factors and features were all deliberately distributed randomly across 
the 30 phishing website scenarios. One phishing factor could appear in many phishing scenarios 
and one phishing scenario could have more than one factor or feature. This is illustrated in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3: Phishing factor indicators 
 
Phishing Factor Indicator No. of 
Appearance 
Appearance 
Percentage 
% 
Using the IP Address 14 46.66 
Abnormal Request URL 30 100 
Abnormal URL of Anchor 7 23.33 
Abnormal DNS Record 2 06.66 
Abnormal URL 5 16.66 
Using SSL Certificate 17 56.66 
Certification Authority 4 13.33 
Abnormal Cookie 2 06.66 
Distinguished Names Certificate(DN) 4 13.33 
Redirect Pages 3 10.00 
Straddling Attack 2 06.66 
Pharming Attack 4 13.33 
Using onMouseOver to Hide the Link 6 20.00 
Server Form Handler (SFH) 2 06.66 
Spelling Errors 24 80.00 
Copying Website 5 16.66 
Using Forms with “Submit” Button 6 20.00 
Using Pop-Ups Windows 8 26.66 
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Disabling Right-Click 2 06.66 
Long URL Address 22 73.33 
Replacing Similar Characters for URL  16 53.33 
Adding Prefix or Suffix 9 30.00 
Using the @ Symbol to Confuse 6 20.00 
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes 8 26.66 
Much Emphasis on Security and Response 5 16.66 
Public Generic Salutation 12 40.00 
Buying Time to Access Accounts 3 10.00 
 
As Table 3 presents, the phishing factor indicator ARUL "Abnormal Request URL" appeared in 
all 30 of the phishing scenarios. Furthermore, the phishing factor indicator, "Spelling Error", 
appeared in 80% of the phishing scenarios (24 appearances). In contrast, phishing factors such 
as "Abnormal DNS Record" and "Disabling Right Click" have the fewest appearances (6.66 %, 
representing 2 appearances). We made sure that each phishing factor indicator had appeared at 
least once in the phishing website scenarios. 
 
The result from this experiment was very interesting. As shown in Table 4, in the first, 
untrained, group we found 72% of their decisions were wrong regarding the legitimacy of the 
websites presented to them in the experiment. These results were represented by either False 
Positive Case (FP, 38%), which happens when a legitimate website is considered as phishing by 
the participant, or by False Negative (FN, 34%), which happens when a phishing website is 
considered legitimate by the participant. Just 28% of their decisions  were right regarding the 
legitimacy of the website, represented by either  True Positive Case (TP, 11%) , which happens 
when a legitimate website is considered legitimate by the participant, or by True Negative (TN, 
17%), which happens when a phishing website is considered as phishing by the participant.  
Figure 6 represents the column chart for website legitimacy decisions for the first, untrained, 
group.  
 
We found that most of these wrong decisions made by first, untrained, group arose from their 
lack of knowledge and awareness of the most common phishing website tricks and deceptions. 
Most of them did not pay attention at all to some very obvious phishing clues or indications like 
address bar contents, URL, domain name, page style, page contents and security indicators like 
SSL certificate or logos, leading to this high incorrect decision percentage. Most of their 
decisions and judgments concentrated on the look of the website and its fancy colours, pictures 
and animation style, thus supporting the arguments mentioned by Dhamija, et al., (2006). 
 
Five decades of research (Kinjo and Snodgrass, 2000; Stenberg, 2006) demonstrates that the 
human brain processes visual imagery more reliably than text. Time and time again, it has been 
found that pictures are remembered better than words, because pictures are more likely than 
words to evoke both verbal and imagery codes. Furthermore, concepts presented in pictures 
rather than words are much more likely to be remembered. 
 
The basis of the Picture Superiority Effect can be attributed to the greater sensory 
distinctiveness pictures have compared to words. Recognizing image categories minimizes the 
load on a user’s memory by making options visible in plain sight. The user is not burdened or 
discouraged by trying to remember difficult, complex characters. Humans are capable of 
remembering between five to nine chunks of static information at a time. 
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However, in a dynamic environment such as the Web, a user’s memory capacity is limited to 
roughly two or three chunks of information, thereby making the Web “an enemy of human 
memory” (Rhodes, 1998). 
 
 
Table 4: The results of website legitimacy decisions for the first group (Untrained group) 
 
Decision 
Website 
Legitimacy 
True False 
 
Positive 
TP (11%) 
275 Decision 
FP (38%) 
950 Decision 
 
Negative 
TN (17%) 
425 Decision 
FN (34%) 
850 Decision 
 
 
True
Positive
True
Negative
False
Positive False 
Negative
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Website 
Legitimacy
True. False.
Decision
Website legitimacy decisions for the first group
Positive
Negative
 
 
Figure 6: Website legitimacy decisions chart for first group 
 
Regarding the second, trained, group, the results were totally different. Their previous 
experience of the phishing website experiment and the skills they gained from that were very 
obvious, and played a big role in the total outcomes.  
 
As shown in Table 5, from the second, trained, group we found 72% of their decisions were 
right regarding the legitimacy of the website, represented by either True Positive Case (TP, 
39%) or by True Negative (TN, 33%). Just 28% of their decisions were wrong regarding the 
legitimacy of the websites presented to them in the experiment. These results were represented 
by either False Positive Case (FP, 12%) or by False Negative (FN, 16%).  Figure 7 represents 
the column chart for website legitimacy decisions by the second, trained, group.  
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We found that most of these correct decisions made by the second, trained, group resulted from 
their good experience, knowledge and awareness of the most common phishing website tricks 
and deception attacks that they had faced before. Most of them depended on their judgment and 
assessment of the website address bar, URL domain name and the different security indicators. 
They were not fooled by the design, style or fancy look of the website structure or animation, 
and their main concentration was focused on detecting all phishing website factor indicators, 
which led to this acceptable correct decision percentage. This of course suggests the importance 
of conducting phishing training awareness for all users.  
 
Table 5: The results of website legitimacy decisions for the second group (Trained group) 
 
Decision 
Website 
Legitimacy 
True False 
 
Positive 
TP (39%) 
975 Decision 
FP (12%) 
300 Decision 
 
Negative 
TN (33%) 
825 Decision 
FN (16%) 
400 Decision 
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Figure 7: Website legitimacy decisions chart for second group 
 
Nevertheless, still some expert employees of the second trained group did not took the right 
decision for some of phishing or legitimate websites, and they were fooled for some visual 
deception phishing attacks. These results illustrate that traditional standard security phishing 
factor indicators are not effective enough for detecting phishing website, and suggest that 
alternative intelligent approaches are needed. 
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5. PHISHING EXPERIMENTS REACTION ANALYSIS  
 
While some employees saw the learning value of the experience, and appreciated the insights 
they had gained as a result of being part of the study, there were more employees who felt that 
the study had no value, and felt violated at not having been asked permission before the 
experiment was performed.  
 
Some of the employees called the experiment unethical, inappropriate, illegal and 
unprofessional. These reactions highlight that phishing has a significant psychological cost for 
victims. Many employees stated that they did not and would never fall for such an attack. This 
natural denial reaction suggests that we may find it hard to admit to our own vulnerability. As a 
consequence, many successful phishing attacks may go unreported, meaning that phishing 
success rates in surveys may be severely underestimated. Phishers know that most users don’t 
know how to check the security and often assume that sites requesting sensitive information are 
secured. When users don’t know how secure they are, they assume that they are secured, and 
it’s not easy for them to see the difference between authentic security and mimicked security 
features. We found that security is often a secondary goal for most of our employees. They did 
not look at the address bar, status bar, or certificate authority. They often focus on their major 
tasks, and neglect all other security pointers or warning messages. Some employees were fooled 
by the presence of an SSL closed padlock icon appearing within the body of a web page instead 
of looking for it in the right place. Many employees always looked for a certain type of content 
like the closed padlock icon when making their judgment and they never mentioned the other 
security features like the characters and numbers shown in the address bar, the certificate 
authority or any other factors whatsoever. Some employees did not look for any SSL signs that 
can distinguish the secured encrypted website from the non-secured one, such as observing the 
“HTTPS” in the address bar. Some employees had some reservations when they saw an IP 
address instead of a domain name and they were able to distinguish between them. On the other 
hand, many did not know what an IP address is!  
 
Most of our employees did not check the certificate that was presented to their browser in our 
study since they do not know what it means; those that do know occasionally check them out. 
Some employees pointed out that the content details of the website and its fancy design and 
style were one of the main reasons for their opinion about the legitimacy of the website. They 
assumed that the site would be legitimate if it contained high quality images and lots of 
animations. Many employees who clicked on the forged VeriSign logo that we created did not 
compare the URL displayed in the faked pop-up window, which shows the SSL certificate status 
of www.ahlionline.com.jo hosted at VeriSign, to the URL in the address bar to detect whether 
they are referring to the same website. Unfortunately, any site can provide a link to this pop-up 
page in order to gain credibility (Jagatic, et al., 2007). Some employees never paid any attention 
to the SSL padlock icon. Other employees did not know the meaning of the SSL padlock icon at 
all, and they could not give any justification for its existence. We found most of our employees 
do not know how to check or locate the self-signed certificate, and they have never checked a 
certificate before. We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the most 
sophisticated users. 
 
As a conclusion, most of our employees made incorrect decisions about the legitimacy of the e-
banking website because of their lack of knowledge and understanding of the phishing 
techniques and its malicious methods and indicators.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
It is being predicted that social engineering phishing attacks will be on the rise in the years to 
come. Billions of dollars are lost every year by corporations and internet users to social 
engineering attacks, in the process making participants in e-commerce increasingly distrustful. 
The problem of social engineering attack is that there is no single solution to eliminate it 
completely, since it deals largely with the human factor. That’s why implementing empirical 
experiments was very crucial in order to study and to analyze all malicious and deceiving 
strategies and attack techniques that were successful in confusing general users about their 
assessments of the authenticity and the legitimacy of  websites. These experiments showed that 
there is no substitute for a good awareness campaign when implementing the social engineering 
elements of security policy.  
 
Our experimental case-studies point to the need for extensive educational campaigns about 
phishing and other security threats. People can become less vulnerable with a heightened 
awareness of the dangers of phishing. Our experimental case-studies also suggest that a new 
approach is needed to design a usable model for detecting e-banking phishing websites, taking 
into consideration the user's knowledge, understanding, awareness and consideration of the 
phishing pointers located outside the user’s centre of consideration. 
 
Results and reactions to our experiments show the importance of conducting phishing training 
awareness for all users. Nevertheless these results illustrate that traditional standard security 
phishing factor indicators are not always effective enough for detecting phishing website, and 
suggest that alternative intelligent approaches are needed.  
Generally speaking, the primary advantage for criminals conducting phishing attacks is the 
public’s lack of education and awareness of both the existence of financial crimes targeting 
Internet users and the policies and procedures of online sites for contacting their customers 
regarding account information and maintenance issues. Thus, public education and awareness 
are important factors to counter phishing. As awareness of phishing grows among consumers, 
the incidences of phishing will shrink to a certain extent. 
 
However, getting rid of phishing through education alone will be very difficult. First of all, there 
are always new or technology-naive Internet users who do not have any experience, and become 
victims of phishing. Another aspect is that phishers are getting better and better at mimicking 
genuine emails and websites; even the security expert may sometimes be fooled.  
 
As a future work, we want to build an e-learning security awareness application regarding 
phishing attacks and scams; we will implement it to be used as a learning tool to increase the 
user awareness regarding phishing attacks and scams. We plan to demonstrate our decision 
justification extracted phishing features and their significance influence as summarized report. 
We also want to integrate phishing detection assessment user interface (example: short 
questionnaires, tests cases) to measure the effectiveness of our e-learning tools. To make the 
learning mechanism more effective and interactive, we are considering integrating concept of 
phishing games on the e-learning process.  This ensures our package to be more dynamic and 
user friendly.  
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